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1. Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation attempts to give a point of view about the political 
sustainability of EMU and the integration process in Europe, highlighting the 
dominant role of neo-fuctionalists‘ theory in the process of European integration.  
Nowadays, living within a social and economic recession the problem of political 
sustainability of EMU, as analyzed by David Mackay in his very analytical paper with 
the title ―political sustainability of EMU‖ in 1999 becomes relevant. Especially in 
Greece the problem is very obvious. Nobody today can assure us today about the 
future impact on society and business but further more on the continuation of our 
nation and other nations with similar problems like Spain and Portugal. 
 
 
2. Introduction 
 
Although the following remarks may seem as the most inauspicious conclusion 
for the Eurozone, I will start by citing them since they reflect present reality, and in 
order to clarify the conceptual framework according to which the EMU was created. 
While Europe is plunged into financial crisis, Berlin is most benefitted, 
according to the German press: a weak euro implies stronger exports, while the 
uncertainty about the bonds of the remaining Eurozone members stops at the 
German borders, reducing the cost of government loans. The weakness of the 
economies of Greece, Portugal and Spain, which are downgraded one after the 
other, result in a more flourishing German economy, while they lead Eurozone to 
severe skepticism about its future. 
The warning sent by the president of the European Commission, José Manuel 
Barroso is characteristic: democracy in Greece, Spain, and Portugal could collapse 
unless urgent action is taken to tackle the debt crisis these countries face. During a 
briefing towards trade union leaders, whose content delayed quite a while before 
being revealed, Mr. Barroso expressed his concern that the southern Europe 
countries struck by the crisis may fall victim to military coups or social uprising, as 
their public sector collapses1  
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 If Greece, Spain, and Portugal do not implement the financial stability 
packages, they will be literally wiped out from the map in terms of democracies as we 
know them today.2 Today the political sustainability of these countries is depending 
on whether German workers would be tolerant to support their poor European 
relatives at the cost to loose their own welfare. There is no any prospect for South 
European countries if the controversial European economic policy, which relies on 
national economies, will not adopt a common European strategy most focused on the 
initial purpose and this will be achieved only through a common accepted European 
government legitimized by European citizens. 
Until today the EMU seems to keep the pace of its most powerful member, 
Germany, the ECB remains ―obsessed‖ with the goal of maintaining the directive to 
maintain price stability and Southern European countries are struck by the crisis, 
excessive debts, pressure towards financial discipline based on the Stability Pact and 
political uncertainty propelled by social phenomena as unemployment, poverty and, 
worst of all, the lack of optimism for the future.3 
 
3. A brief historical overview 
 
It could be the Werner‘s report 4, the first effort for the birth of the idea of an 
European economic union, a report that already contained all the elements of the 
future Economic and Monetary Union that would be decided at Maastricht 5, but the 
most determined step began in March 1979, more than thirty years ago. This was 
when the ECU (European Currency Unit), the precursor to the Euro, came into being. 
The currency volatility which followed the break down in the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange rate system in 1973 was a shock to policy makers and seen as a major 
source of economic instability during the 1970s. The goal in Europe was to create a 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) which minimized currency volatility and 
set the stage for monetary union by fixing a maximum 2.25% range for currency 
fluctuation. But this also required a degree of economic harmonization between 
countries on fiscal and monetary policy. 
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Unfortunately, the harmonization was not forthcoming. Italy, in particular, was 
seen as politically unstable, with thirty different governments in the post-war First 
Republic from 1946-1994 and another eight since then. This meant that Italy often 
operated with a large fiscal deficit. It had high rates of inflation and a weak currency. 
Therefore, during the ERM days, its currency band was set at 6%. Greece‘s, Spain‘s 
and Portugal‘s dictatorships were fallen regimes changed in 1974 and 1975 and 
1976 respectively, paving the way for entry into the European Union in the 1980s. 
However, they too had fiscal, currency and inflation problems. So when the Euro‘s 
terms were set in 1992 in the Maastricht Treaty, the Germans, in particular, were 
adamant about inserting the Stability and Growth Pact.6 
The Germans, who had seen their currency destroyed by Hyperinflation in the 
1920s and the Nazis in the 1940s, were keen to ensure a strong currency. The 
Deutsche Mark had been a strong currency and this strength was seen as a major 
source of the German economic miracle which brought the country back from 
collapse after World War II. So, at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, the Germans 
wanted more European integration to keep the tensions which had led to two 
devastating wars in the 20th century at bay. But they also wanted to prevent free 
riders (like Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) from watering down the Euro with an 
inflationary economic policy and making it a weak currency. Here the role of 
European Central Bank is catalytic in order to be sustainable the deflationary 
tendencies. During the negotiation period of the Maastricht Treaty, it was the English-
French central bank model that dominated in almost all member states; the final 
prevalence of the German model is, in general, a surprising outcome. There are two 
main reasons that led to the acceptance of the German model, as mentioned by Paul 
de Grauwe in the sixth edition of his book ―The Economics of Monetary Union‖. The 
first one refers to the philosophical evolution, that is the monetarist counter-
revolution, which leads to the political independence of the central bank 7, and the 
second one is related to Germany‘s strategic position in the process that led to the 
EMU.  
The mechanism eventually chosen to stop free riders was the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). This provision set strict limits on fiscal policy, namely an annual 
budget deficit of no greater than 3% and a debt-to-GDP ratio either of no greater than 
60% or declining toward that Deutsche Mark 8. 
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Today, however, it is exceptionally difficult for there to be a unification of fiscal 
policy, since such an action would be the equivalent of complete restructuring of 
state power in the European Union. The states in the euro zone have a clear 
hierarchy and their national interests have not ceased to exist. The legitimacy of each 
state originates from its history. Local structures of power and popular consensus, 
also including democratic elections, form in turn the legitimacy of the state. Nor does 
the prospect of creating a unified European state exist, and therefore there is no 
disposition to institute a single fiscal policy. 
 
 
4. European Central Bank and Southern Europe. How did its strategy 
influence the current situation in South Europe and how ECB could 
contribute to the rescue of countries in South Europe? 9 
 
 
Under the pressure of the German authorities to adopt the economists‘ 
model, the European Central Bank has been clearly orientated towards keeping 
inflation rates low, while having tenuous jurisdiction over the stabilization of product 
and employment oscillations10. In this sense, the ECB could be characterized as 
conservative. Such a notion is supported by taking into account the treatment 
received by a society in case of potential recession, since a conservative Central 
Bank exercises a less expansive policy in order to face temporary aberrations in 
employment, causing a confrontation with elected politicians, which usually meet 
society‘s needs. A protective wall, of course, has been created in order for the ECB 
to defend its political interventions. 
 
The independence granted to the ECB is extensive. When the ECB is 
accountable to the European Parliament, it faces an institution that cannot change its 
regulation. This regulation can be modified only by changing the Treaty, which in turn 
demands the unanimous agreement of all EU member states. 
 
Of course, the trump played by the ECB regards the vagueness concerning 
its objectives, as set in the Maastricht Treaty, which gave its management the 
possibility to choose their targets, thus limiting the field of its jurisdictions and 
responsibilities for which it could be monitored 11.  
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To sum up, it could be stated that the responsibility of the ECB is limited 
owing to two reasons. First, there are not such potent political institutions in Europe 
that could exert necessary control in terms of the fulfillment of ECB‘s goals. Second, 
which justifies ECB being labeled as conservative, is the fact that the ECB has 
limited the range of its responsibilities to maintaining low inflation rates, so that, in 
effect, it has to give account only for its anti-inflation performance.  
  
The fact that the ECB has limited its jurisdiction only to its anti-inflation 
performance has created a long-term problem concerning its political support. It is 
difficult to understand how the European politicians will keep supporting an institution 
on which they have so limited control. Most certainly it would be rational in a period of 
lingering recession to have disagreement among the governments composing the 
EMU and the ECB, especially if the latter insisted in a feeble treatment to avoid the 
escalation of crisis and unemployment. Of course, the ECB took measures already 
from the first stage of the crisis, in summer 2007, in order to provide liquidity, 
although for a significant period it kept a restrictive stance with respect to interest 
rates, in collaboration with the US Federal Reserve Bank. 
 
Of course, the ECB could prevent any possible disputed with politicians. This 
would demand for transparency in the decisions made by the ECB towards the public 
opinion, promoting this way unofficial decision making. For instance, many 
economists, among which Syensson, claim that inflation targeting promotes unofficial 
decision making. Of course, nothing of the sort happen from the ECB part; besides, it 
is asserted that article 10.4 of the regulation prohibits the publication of minutes and 
voting results, although this is also just an interpretation.12 
 
 
Criticism against the ECB should, of course, be directed taking FED into 
account, in order to conclude whether its decisions and policies played a key role to 
the recession of Greek economy at first, and also to that of other countries facing 
similar problems, such as Spain and Portugal 
As it is well known, Greece owes a debt of approximately 320 bil. Euros, 
which refinanced normally until October 2009, when under the pressure exerted by 
the revelations on the real magnitude of the deficit and the practices that permitted 
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Greece to join the EU, by forging the data on its real debt with stock market products, 
the bond markets became more and more reluctant to provide loans to Greece. 
As credit rating companies base their evaluation system primarily on whether 
a country is in position to pay buck their debts normally, when the markets started to 
close for Greece and the loan cost began to rise, these companies started to 
downgrade Greece, creating a vicious circle where the markets expected a new 
downgrade by the rating companies, and the latter expected that the markets would 
ask for much higher interest rates in order to lend money to Greece, which could not 
therefore refinance its debt. 
This resulted in a cycle of successive downgrades, the launching of the loan 
cost for Greece and finally its exit of the bond markets. When Greece turned to its 
partners, they urged it, upon German recommendation, towards the IMF, an 
institution that until that time had absolutely no relation with EU countries. After the 
IMF expressed its approval, they agreed to grant the ―support package‖. 
In this case, the credit evaluation houses would have no reason to consider 
that Greece would not be able to refinance its debt in the long term, as it would enjoy 
the support of the ECB for 10-15 years, the markets would not fear future 
downgrade, so as to demand even higher interest rates in order to provide loans, the 
loan cost would remain low and the Greek, and consequently the European crisis 
would have never existed. 
All this could have been avoided if the ECB, following the FED‘s steps, had 
announced a refinancing program of the Greek debt with favorable interest rates, 
along with Greece‘s engagement to adopt a fiscal rationalization and community debt 
redemption plan, on a 10-15 or even 20-year term.  
But how could the ECB do such a thing given that it is not provisioned in the 
Maastricht Treaty? The same way that, although not provisioned, a member state 
was obliged to contract with the IMF as soon as it faced a liquidity crisis, the same 
way the ECB purchased covered member state bonds, while there was no such 
option in its Memorandum of Understanding and in the Maastricht Treaty, that the 
member states, in cooperation with the ECB, voted for the ―support package‖ outside 
European legislation, that although no EU country does not comply, years now, all 
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Maastricht criteria, none has been penalized or asked to withdraw from the EU, that 
the ECT accepted Greek bonds rated as ―junk‖ from the French banks as a 
guarantee for the provision of liquidity, helping them to get rid of them, while the initial 
agreement prohibited the acceptance of non-AAA bonds etc.13 
The truth is that the ECB acts as the FED, but only selectively. Should Europe 
actually desired to avoid, prevent or at least provide a deferred solution to the Greek 
problem, the only thing they should do was to buy a large number of Greek bonds 
directly from the Greek state and not from the banks, and to support the country by 
providing low interest rates for a long period of time, at the same time allowing 
Greece to access the bond market at low cost. 
Gradually, as the Greek economy would strengthen, Greece would pay back 
its debt to the ECB, the bonds would be withdrawn from the market and, along them, 
the money, which would have been created. Indeed something as is referred above 
was not realized by ECB and the crisis in Eurozone revealed problems that were 
previously reported by Steve Mckay in his very well structured paper with title ―The 
political sustainability of EMU‖ which was published in 1999. 
 
 
 5.  The Stability and Growth Pact. Is It Time for Its Revision? 
 
The SGP was adopted in 1997 on June 17 at the European Council meeting 
in Amsterdam. The principle that governs the SGP is the achievement of the 
medium-term objective of balanced or surplus budgets. 
The main pursuit of the Stability Pact is economic (nominal and real) 
convergence. However, eleven years after the Treaty of Maastricht and five years 
after the Treaty of Amsterdam, this ―burning‖ desire remains unreachable. Besides, 
some adopt the position of the Communist Party of Greece that ―the path of unequal 
development cannot be abolished in the framework of capitalist unification and that 
the goal of convergence, whether nominal or not, numerical or not, will not be 
reached either now or tomorrow.‖ 14 
The opinion of the left in Greece, but also in the rest of Europe, that the 
unequal development of economies in the capitalist system does not allow their real 
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convergence and that the discourse of ―convergence‖ is maintained in order for 
leaders to justify a series of measures and policies harmful to the working class and 
the people, finds many supporters. Even this view, however, is not supported by 
casual arguments. It is true that the so-called structural changes, namely capitalist 
restructuring, were decided on and applied in the name of ―real convergence‖ and the 
Stability Pact, in particular the drastic reduction of the resources of state budgets that 
relate to the provision of ―social services‖, combined with their privatization, in order 
for some countries such as Greece not to lose their dominance. 
A characteristic example, besides, is the statement by Werner Sinn, head of 
the prestigious IFO Institute in Munich, who ―claims that the austerity measures will 
not prevent bankruptcy. He claimed that the policy of imposed internal devaluation, 
deflation, and recession could lead Greece to the brink of civil war.‖  This statement 
makes Europe think more deeply, since now voices are being heard which for many 
nowadays are unrealistic, but based on history, may come true. The beginning of the 
collapse of the fabric of Greek society is a probable scenario if unemployment rates 
grow next year, as is expected.  
Although the main goal with the Stability Pact is the formation of more or less 
unified conditions for the common currency, the euro, albeit in capitalist economies 
that are developing unevenly, whose cycles are each at a different point, without the 
Pact risks for its functioning would ensue. 
Nor, of course, did the Stability Pact prove to be a political decision that can 
deal with economic inequality or recession. It can, however, as an applied policy, 
intensify exploitation, since the measures that are taken by state governments have 
as their result the cheapening of workers' salaries, but also the transfer of the 
consequences of the recession mainly to countries that originally showed problems 
with the structure of their economy, another view of the left that seems to find a 
response mainly among the working class.15 
  Another characteristic statement is that of the president of the European 
Commission, Romano Prodi, who admitted in an interview that the Stability Pact is 
not effective, like all inelastic decisions, because it creates obstacles for the 
application of another management policy (a Keynesian one, with more of a ―social 
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state‖), in order for social contrasts not to be heightened and the political stability of 
the eurozone threatened. 
Given the fiscal pressure on several member states, one interesting proposal 
comes from three important academics in the field of European studies who suggest 
a new pact that will determine the rules for state economics. As they emphasize in 
their study with the title ―A Suitable European Union for the 'Purpose' in the Global 
Age‖, ―for someone to sustain that there is no need for radical change to the Stability 
Pact is like claiming that the European Union should not take a position.‖ In this 
study, the president of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 
Loukas Tsoukalis, the director of the Policy Network, Olaf Kramme, and the president 
of the same institute, Roger Little, propose the setting of ―new, constructive goals‖ for 
each member state, with the criterion being sustainable public debt in the long term. 
They consider that ―the key‖ will be an agreement to commit a sufficient part of the 
revenue from growth for debt reduction, but also the avoidance of sufficiently 
aggressive fiscal adjustment that would limit growth. At the same time, they underline 
the importance of the quality of publlic expenditure and suggest the definition of what 
constitutes a social investment, based on which member states will be compared to 
one another.16 
While pointing out that the stance of Germany is absolutely critical for this 
issue, the three academics consider that a new ―great agreement‖ is possible, in the 
framework of which the more vulnerable states will promote the reforms that 
Germany demands. Further terms of exchange that would calm Germany would on 
the other hand emphasize even further the character of ―Germanized‖ Europe, which 
will  always obey the orders of the former.   
The expected emphasis on social Europe, as well as the effort by the Spanish 
presidency to promote a new European ―social charter‖ to strengthen protection for 
employment and social integration and cohesion, rather seems to be vain hopes. The 
problem is visible, however: according to the three academics mentioned above, the 
majority of the growth in employment was based on ―second-rate‖ jobs, which are 
insecure with limited rights. As they point out, it will be increasingly difficult to 
safeguard the privileged nucleus of jobs. Thus, they expect more pressure in the 
direction of flexible employment, in exchange for the strengthening of social 
protection. In this framework, they point out that priority must be attached to policies 
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that invest in the social future, and especially in supporting children and youth in 
dealing with generational inequalities. However, how it is possible for this to be 
achieved from the moment that there is no political unity of spirit in Europe and the 
countries of the South are subjected to continuous pressure for stricter austerity 
measures that affect social protection while also allowing unemployment to 
accelerate, in the absence of public investments and with a reduction of public 
expenditure? 
As though the extended crisis that the countries of Southern Europe are 
undergoing and the high deficits that they have to face were not enough, Greece 
appears to be in a worse position, as its public debt will balloon to 450 billion euro, in 
accordance with the memorandum. The place where the European Summit will be 
held in Brussels on October 29th, at which the 27 leaders of the European Union will 
be invited to agree on the proposals of their President Hermann Von Rompuy to 
adopt rules of strangling fiscal supervision, as Germany and France expressed their 
desire through the letter sent by their Ministers of the Economy, for the countries that 
show high deficits and are undermining the reliability of the European currency, is 
being turned into a Roman arena. 
The Franco-German proposal to Mr. Van Rompuy, as Community sources in 
Brussels say, for a political agreement among the 27 that will establish very strict 
economic and political sanctions for those European countries that systematically 
violate the rules of the Stability Growth Pact, will provoke a wave of protests among 
the other Community leaders, with the consequence being the exposure of a crisis 
also in the political element of the problem of delays to full economical integration.  
The problem, as the same sources say, does not lie simply in the strict 
application of the Stability Pact, but the expansion of Community supervision to the 
harmonization of national budgets with the orders of the Pact and the proposed 
―penalties‖ for those who are not in compliance. 
Regarding Paris and Berlin, the problem is the application of a form of 
supervision with the possibility of sanctions also in ―new‖ fields such as private debt, 
by which the Spanish economy is affected, or the low level of competitiveness of a 
member state such as Greece and Portugal, in relation to the average of the 27 and 
the average of the 16 member states of the euro zone.  
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The probable adoption of these rules excludes every possibility of exercising 
a different policy in the case that social democratic governments come to power in 
European countries and wish to apply policies with a broader social dimension. 
Certainly, the harmonization of political ideologies based on preserving ―German 
domination‖ in Europe will create sociopolitical instability. In Greece, the loss of 
national sovereignty with subjection to the IMF as an overseer and a lender outside 
the EMU, is already a reality. No political entity could react otherwise but by following 
the memorandum faithfully and applying financial decisions that seem logical to 
everyone, such as the increase of indirect taxes, the reduction of salaries and state 
expenditure, which, however, will lead Greece to social stagnation, in spite of the 
presence of a socialist government; the exercise of social policy seems to many to be 
a midsummer night's dream, as long as the above measures are imposed and the 
situation will deteriorate to the point that an exit scenario for some member states 
such as Greece would seem to be the least beneficial scenario.    
The adoption of these rules, however, also creates other problems, since it 
also makes the application of the provisions of the Stability Pact unbearable, since, 
without some other reforms, is leaves the weakest member states unprotected from 
financial, fiscal, and social intra-European competition. 
Analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of the Stability and Growth Pact 
below, we will have a clearer picture of its influence on the current situation of the 
Southern countries in theoretical terms. In general, like the European Central Bank, 
the SGP attaches importance to protecting countries that possess the mainly 
financial infrastructure to control their fiscal data for the benefit of their welfare, which 
seems to have as its purpose the strengthening of citizen confidence in national 
governments. As for the states that display structural problems, such as high deficits 
and high public and private debt, the SGP, combined with the  extended recession, 
puts a brake on any hope for development with the rules that it suggests and 
imposes and essentially makes governments accountable for the lack of optimism 
that is cultivated in the electoral policy, and the scenario of social upheavals is 
widespread in the European Union, even in countries that may present less social 
problems than Greece, Spain, and Portugal.17 
The close relationship between the state budget deficit and public debt 
constitutes one of the factors that require the existence of fiscal rules. Budget deficits 
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have as their result the growth of public debt, which will have to be serviced in the 
future by later generations if it is not reduced in the medium term. If the interest on 
the public debt exceeds the growth rate of the economy, a debt process that leads to 
continuously increasing public debt in relation to the GDP is put in motion. In some 
cases, such as that of Greece, the debt process was not immediately noticed, with 
the consequence that both debt and deficits grew. 
 
A country that observes that it is on a course of increasing public debt creates 
negative external consequences for the other countries in the monetary union. And 
this is because the specific country is forced to seek recourse in the international 
capital markets increasingly often, with the result that it pushes the prevailing interest 
rate in the Union upward due to the financial risk that ensues. In turn, the increase in 
interest rates in the Union increases the public debt burden of the other countries. If 
the governments of those countries choose to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio, they 
will be forced to follow a more austere fiscal policy. Therefore, the unsustainable 
increase in a country's debt forces the others to follow more anti-inflation policies. 
Thus, it will be in the interest of the other countries to have a control mechanism such 
as the SGP that will limit the size of budget deficits and where we can excuse 
German and French politicians who insist on the creation of a stricter SGP which will 
most protect the political stability within their states besides the fact that some 
countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal will be forced to lose their sovereignty   
or they will withdraw from EMU.18 
 
Strict and tough limitation of deficits is one of the most important conditions 
that must be satisfied in order for the euro to become a stable and reliable currency. 
In the existing monetary system, repeated budget deficits would create problems for 
the common currency and by extension, for the money market. The perception of 
imminent risks would have adverse effects on investment, thus destroying the 
prospects for economic development and job creation in the euro zone. The limitation 
of deficits, together with continuing fiscal competition among the tax systems of 
certain member states, constitutes one of the remaining safety valves against 
unreasonable government expenditure and the displacement of private investment in 
the euro zone. 
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Of course, besides the positive elements of the SGP, there are many who 
criticize the existence of fiscal rules which more prohibit the balance between 
countries in south and north Europe. The below mentioned comments refer to some 
points that need to be revised on behalf of a truly common European economic 
policy.  
 
The main reason for its weakening is the lack of flexibility in the budget facing 
recession. It is probable that this situation will create tensions between national 
governments and the European institutions. And this is because from the moment 
that the countries will not be able to use their budgets as automatic stabilizers during 
recessions, they will increase the pressure on the ECB to relax its monetary policy, 
which means the appearance of inflationary tendencies.  Therefore, in a paradoxical 
way, the Stability Pact, whose goal was to protect the ECB from political pressure, 
may substantially increase the risk of national political pressure being exercised. 
 
The absence of rewards: for a country that is in a stable situation and has 
balanced or surplus budgets, there is no reward from the Stability Pact.  
 
It is impossible to impose the fines foreseen by the SGP due to the 
involvement of a political body. It is difficult for the penalties and sanctions foreseen 
in the Pact to be imposed, since the decision is made by a purely political body 
(specifically, by the ECOFIN Committee). Precisely this fact raises many questions, 
since politicians are flexible towards their partners and the probable political 
instability that may be provoked by the imposition of the fine. 
 
 The SGP discourages public investment because in order for a country to 
keep its budget balanced or in surplus, capital expenses must be financed by current 
income. That is, it is not possible to allocate the cost of the investment program to the 
future generations that will benefit from it. 
 
The SGP mainly places emphasis on short-term commitments and 
underestimates structural reforms. The specific argument has three dimensions: 
firstly, the Pact puts all the weight on the short-term goal for the limitation of deficits. 
It provides governments with incentive to apply creative accounting, which 
constitutes a blow to the transparency of public finances. The case of Greece, with its 
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hidden deficit, constitutes the outstanding example, which, however, had a history 
before Greece entered the euro zone. Secondly, the SGP does not take hidden 
public debt into account, nor the exceptional obligations of the social insurance 
system. Lastly, the SGP, by placing emphasis on the short-term limitation of deficits, 
in practice hinders the undertaking of long-term policies, such as the reform of the 
insurance system, which lead to stabilization and the improvement of the economy's 
competitiveness.19 
 
6. Southern Europe and the crisis in EMU 
 
 
The roots of the crisis lie in the heart of the global financial system, which 
passed through a stage of acute destabilization and entered into a tough period after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. It is undoubtedly the most 
acute crisis the global economy faces after the recession of the 30‘s and it cannot be 
compared with the stock market turbulences experienced in 1987, which were more 
readily addressed and shorter in duration. 
 
Furthermore, as cited by Mr. Alogoskoufis in a seminar organized by the 
Economia Business Tank in November 2008, although economies today are more 
interdependent than they used to be in the past, no serious efforts have been made 
to integrate to the global financial management system the emerging economies, 
whose significance keeps rising. It was, therefore, reasonable to watch the crisis 
strike the core of global economy and to diffuse the problem to all individual 
economies, in accordance with their characteristics and financial data.20 
 
 It was more or less known that Europe and the Eurozone would not be able 
to take after a fiscal expansion, such as that of America, given the fiscal conditions of 
some of its member states. The increment of state expenses and tax reduction would 
unavoidably come with a contestation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Besides that, 
Europe is lacking a uniform strategy of policy. During the time when several countries 
in the Eurozone enjoyed a certain degree of development, no income was deposited 
in order to face such a crisis and to reduce deficits. As a consequence, it resulted 
that only a few countries disposed of the necessary fiscal margins to implement a 
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more expansive fiscal policy. It should not be overlooked that during the period when 
the first crisis erupted, Eurozone countries such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal had 
just passed through a process to reduce their excessive deficits. 
 
 
- South Europe and the recession in EMU  
 
Southern European countries have a lot of common problems. They have 
high commercial deficits and high unemployment, which might become higher. 
Consequently, they are in need from an internal market aid policy, together with a 
flexible exchange policy, which will assist their exports. Also, they are in need of a 
common lending mechanism, because of the fact that even the countries which are 
not facing high public debt, later on might become targets of speculative attacks. 
 All these countries have some common needs regarding their social-
economic growth, but also they have and some common objectives, EMU orientated, 
which will help them to create a Southern European block for a common 
democratically European policy. However, the high German influence in EU policy 
creates many problems. The German strategy which supporting a very strong Euro, it 
does create problems in its cohesion due to different needs of every country in 
particular. Consequently, above the common wage matter in EU or other common 
matters which EU countries are facing, Euro and the common EU policy are facing a 
crisis (which nobody had forecasted before). This crisis creates needs for new 
settlements. 
This internal depreciation, that being promoted in these countries (which are 
facing economical problems), consists EU‘s new liberalism doctrine. This doctrine 
supports that a country which does not have a national currency in order to 
underestimate its economy, should reduce all the wages and increase mainly all the 
indirect taxes. This policy can cause many problems such as instability in country‘s 
institutions. This is not a correct policy due to the fact that the low - middle class 
individuals are going to pay off this crisis. The most important consequence is a deep 
recession. In Latvia for example, which applied this policy its GDP has being reduced 
by 17% and in Hungary by 6.7%. One more consequence is the high unemployment 
rate in these countries. A third consequence is the fact that the national income is 
being reallocated from the low – middle classes to the upper class. All these 
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consequences change this crisis from economical mainly to social. These countries 
will suffer from an elected ‗‘European‘‘ dictatorship, which will make the political 
completion a very difficult task to achieve. EU seems to be without a capable 
leadership, divided and not brave at all. Without a common economical policy within 
the European countries, in addition with some special conditions EU is not able to 
take some risky initiatives, despite the fact that this current crisis gives the chance to 
EU to come out more powerful; Unfortunately, the EU failure to ball out one of its 
country without IMF help, raise many doubts about EU‘s future.21 
EU is going to spend more than half trillion Euro or the 6% of its GNP trying to 
ball out Spain, Portugal and Greece, but this economical support will not help Greece 
to overcome the recession. EU, apart from this ball out mechanism, has to fight 
market instability in the countries which willing to ball out in the future.  
The forthcoming crisis in Spain and Portugal seems to be worse than crisis in 
Greece, stated Spanish professor of Finance at the international Management 
Institute of Lausanne, Arturo Bris in Le Temps news. Mr. Bris stated as well that the 
problem in Greece is the high cost of lending and that the Greek crisis has being 
created due to bad budget situation and not due to international speculators. Exactly 
same situation had faced some Asian countries in 1997 and some Latin American 
countries in 2002. Also, this crisis was created due to Goldman Sachs actions. IMD‘s 
professor states that Greek‘s government austerity policy is the only way to lead 
Greece out of this crisis but has to be combined together with many investments 
which will stop Greek recession. In any case, Greek individuals accepts this policy; 
it‘s up to Greek government to convinces them that this policy is the only solution and 
its not be imposed by Brussels. Being questioned, if he is afraid of the transmission 
of the Greek crisis to other countries, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, answered 
that Greek situation is unique due to the fact that everybody in Greece has realized 
all the challenges that should face in the near future. On the contrary, in Spain and in 
Portugal nobody has realized the forthcoming situation; that‘s the reason why this 
situation is more worrying than Greece. Spanish and Portuguese governments have 
to follow Greek‘s government policy. Greeks have seen the iceberg and now are 
learning how to avoid it. Spanish and Portuguese people are being in the dark 
without understanding the existence of this iceberg. Moreover, politicians have to be 
more credible. 
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Spain is not facing as high public debt as Greece; this debt is only 50% of its 
GNP, while its budget deficit (8%) is normal, according to SGP limits, stated Yiorgos 
Stathakis in Avgi news on 20/06/2010. That‘s why a hard Spanish government policy 
seems to be no sense at the moment. Housing and consuming loans might reach the 
120% of GDP. 29 % of GDP is being consisted of enterprising loans, which have 
been given to the construction sector. Many constructions, unfortunately, have not 
finished yet or in some cases have not being sold at all. Their construction has been 
sponsored by Spanish local bank institutions, controlled by political parties or by local 
elites.   
As we know bank institutions acquire fluidity either from European Central 
Bank – by using public obligations, or from the interbank market. The best criterion is 
the smoothly interbank lending: the possibility of one bank to lend to another bank. If 
one bank is facing bankruptcy nobody will take the risk to lend money to this bank. 
This creates more reactions. Consequently, everybody is being focused in bank 
system and not in economy.  
Spain‘s problem seems to be the bank system. But bank system is international. 
A big part of these constructions loans, directly or indirectly, come from German and 
French banks. Precisely, that‘s exactly the same situation with the Greek government 
bonds. We can categorize the toxic titles into three groups: 22 
A) Private consuming lending ‗‘toxics‘‘. Parts of these housing and consuming 
loans are too risky; In Ireland (200% of its GDP), in Spain (120% of its GDP) 
and UK (100% of its GDP). A total value of 2 trillion Euro risky bonds.    
B) Public debt ‗‘toxics‘‘, similar to Greek public debt (300 billions), in the whole 
Europe reach the amount of 8 trillion Euro, from which 1 or 2 trillion Euro 
consider to be too risky. 
C) Enterprising ‗‘toxic‘‘ loans, corporate bonds and any other kinds of companies 
lending. Here we can find not only summer resort constructions or the French 
car industry but also any other kind of enterprise that is being hit by the crisis. 
All these categories of ‗‘‘toxic‘‘ titles can be more than 4 trillion Euro. But we do 
not have to be under panic. EU‘s GDP is roughly 16 trillion Euro, the biggest 
economy in the world. (Entire world‘s GDP is 58 trillion Euro). We have to wait only 
Germany‘s reaction in this smoothly and progressive adaption of unreal values to 
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become equal to real values in order to, these unreal values, be absorbed from the 
incline of the real bond values (this adaption can be financed by Central Bank). 
Germany‘s expected reaction can cause a rapid adaption of unreal bond values to 
real values with dramatically consequences in the economies of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. 
In Portugal, a very strict Public Budget was voted targeting the beginning of a 
new period. Reduction of budget deficit by 1% of GDP it will be achieved with a 
further reduction of wages and public investments as well, together with some 
addition taxes. All these extra measures are going to create many protests in the 
whole country. Public debt from 76.6% of GDP in 2009 will be increased in 85.4%. 
International houses of evaluation (Moody‘s, Fitsch and S&P) stated their concerns 
about this strict government‘s policy. The Portuguese Minister of Finance declared 
that these concerns drove his country to this crisis. 
Moreover, the high budget deficit in 2009 will be 9.3% of GDP, with a try to be 
eliminated in 2010 (8.3%). The negative growth in 2009 (-2.6%), will be increased up 
to 0.7% and unemployment will be decreased from 11% in 9.8% only if the finance 
government budget plan (1.4 billion of Euros) will be successful. We have to mention 
that Portuguese economy is strictly depended on the Spanish economy. 23 
 
-Measuring the regional debt burden 
The total debt, both public and private, of Spain, Portugal and Greece rises to 
5315, 783 and 703 billion Euros, or 506%, 479% and 296% of the GNP, respectively. 
The total debt experienced a twofold to threefold increase in the frame of the EMU. 
 
The ratio of private over public debt in Spain, Portugal and Greece equals to 
87:13, 85:15 and 58:42, respectively. The greater amount of the debt recently 
created during the period of EMU operation was private, while public debt was 
reduced accordingly. 
 
The ratio of foreign over domestic debt in Spain, Portugal and Greece is 
equal to 33:67, 49:51, and 51:49, respectively. The foreign debt ratio has significantly 
risen during the EMU period. The Greek public debt has in large turned to foreign 
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since the European financial markets systematically overestimated the credibility of 
regional member stated. 
The most severe and frugal budget ever proposed in Spain, according to the 
country‘s press, presented Zapatero‘s government aiming at bringing down the deficit 
to 6% of the GNP in 2011. Apart from pension freezing (of which only the lowest are 
increased by 1%) and further reductions in salaries and social allowances, what it is 
also criticized is the reduction of public investments by 38%, 30% in the infrastructure 
section, 7% in Research and Development and 8,1% in the educational sector. In the 
presence of such retrenchments neither unemployment can subside, nor can 
development be stimulated, comments ―El País‖, remarking that Moody‘s 
downgraded the Spanish debt from AAA to A1, just because they start to doubt the 
ability for debt service, without leading to GNP growth. It is to be stated that Spain‘s 
public debt is provisioned according to the budget to rise at a 68.7% of the GNP –half 
of Greece‘s debt- but as it was expanding, nowadays, in the presence of the crisis, 
the expensed to serve such a debt abruptly rise by 18%. 
  
A day earlier Portuguese prime minister Jose Socrates announced the basic 
trends of its budget, which opts for a salary reduction by 5% (he made clear that this 
is to be applied in a scalable fashion to all salaries above 1500 Euros) and a two 
percentage unit rise of the VAT, namely to 23%. Pensions also freeze, while social 
allowances are reduced by 25%. Portugal already followed financial adjustment 
policies. However, in his interview for yesterday‘s Financial Times, Socrates 
underlines that he was forced by the markets to absurdly accelerate the deficit 
reduction in order to assure unhindered loaning for the country.24 
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-10 proposals in order for countries in Southern Europe to overcome the dip and 
bring back development. 
 
The economic crisis in the southern European countries was accompanied 
also by an institution crisis which caused many echoes not only in the general society 
but mainly in the weakest social groups. The governments are trying to give a 
solution to this situation. There is only one way to overcome this situation: by 
development.  
 
Mr. Dimitrios Mardas - assistant professor of Aristotle University of 
Thessaloniki proposed some solutions over this problem, not only for Greece but in 
general for all the countries that face corruption in their political system, as well as 
Greece. Mr. Dimitrios Mardas article is published in Sundays ―Ethnos‘‘ and it finds me 
pact. 25 
 
These solutions (according to the articles) are: 
 
1. Every government has to think always the social profit and not any 
political cost.  
2.  Brain drain immigration has to stop. 
3. Extraversion in other countries is not a solution. 
4. Damage that might be caused by some labor groups due to bad timing of 
taking these decisions has to stop. 
5. All governmental decisions have to be announced by official bulletin and 
not during televisions de bates.  
6. The resources of European Territorial Cooperation Programs have to be 
fully absorbed.  
7. Enterprising environment has to be friendlier in order to attract, as many 
Direct Foreigner Investments, as possible. 
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8. Need to be fined all the individuals who do not pay all their taxes in the 
government. In some cases, confiscation of their personal fortune needs 
to be auctioned. 
9. All the corrupted politicians need to be punished. 
10. Politicians have to take always the most cost effective decision among all. 
 
As Mr. Errikos Mpartzinopoulos in one of his article which was published in 
Sundays ―Ethnos‖ on 08/08/2010 at the page 47 reports, this effort has to begin as 
soon as possible. Greek individual has to be convinced that tax evasion is going to 
cost more to him; Decisions are being taken by IMF, Mr. Tomsen and the powerful 
European countries; not from the Greek government. It goes without saying that this 
is a very ambiguous situation. 
 
 
7. The Eurozone and the support mechanism for Greece. The 
interference of IMF. The fear of a potential and an extensive 
political instability in Europe. 
 
- Eurozone/IMF Financial Assistance to Greece, why the IMF interfered in EMU? 
 
 
On May 2, 2010, Eurozone finance ministers and the IMF agreed on a three-
year program of loans to Greece40 totaling €110 billion (about $145 billion): €80 
billion (about $105 billion) from Eurozone member states and €30 billion (about $40 
billion) from the IMF. The package could reportedly provide €30 billion (about $40 
billion) from the Eurozone and €10 billion (about $13 billion) from the IMF in 2010 to 
help ensure that Greece meets its immediate payment obligations.26  
 
Prior to the decision to loan Greece money, the debate about potential 
Eurozone assistance was contentious. Some observers argued that there are 
compelling reasons for the other Eurozone countries to intervene, asserting that the 
financial stability of the Eurozone, and possibly even the future of the euro, might be 
at stake. Severe instability in the Greek economy had already started to have wider 
consequences—the crisis contributed to a weakening of the euro and raised 
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concerns that it could spread across European bond markets and draw in countries 
such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland. Some observers note that the Greek crisis 
grew worse as Eurozone leaders contemplated a response—critics charge that 
quicker action may have stemmed the crisis at an earlier stage.  
 
There is also a significant political element to the debate. Monetary union is 
seen by many proponents of a strong EU as a crowning achievement of European 
integration. Some observers, therefore, assert that the EU must maintain solidarity 
and that the countries of the Euro zone cannot allow Greece to default, much less 
abandon the euro. 
 
Despite the enactment of the Eurozone-IMF assistance package for Greece, 
investor concerns about the sustainability of Eurozone debt deepened during the first 
week of May 2010. Driven down by such fears, global stock markets plunged sharply 
on May 6, 2010, and the euro fell to a 15-month low against the dollar. Seeking to 
head off the possibility of contagion to countries such as Portugal and Spain, EU 
finance ministers agreed to a broader €500 billion (about $686 billion) ―European 
Financial Stabilization Mechanism‖ on May 9, 2010. Some analysts assert that such 
a bold, large-scale move had become an urgent imperative for the EU in order to 
break the momentum of a gathering European financial crisis. Investors reacted 
positively to the announcement of the new agreement, with global stock markets 
rebounding on May 10, 2010, to re-gain the sharp losses of the week before. 
 
The bulk of the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism package 
consists of a ―Special Purpose Vehicle‖ under which Eurozone countries could make 
available bilateral loans and government-backed loan guarantees totaling up to €440 
billion (about $560 billion) to stabilize the euro area.  
 
The agreement, which expires after three years, requires parliamentary 
ratification in some Eurozone countries. The mechanism additionally allows the 
European Commission to raise money on capital markets and loan up to €60 billion 
(about $76 billion) to Eurozone states. 
 
Previously, such a procedure could only be applied to non-Eurozone 
members of the EU, and was used after the global financial crisis to improve the 
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balance-of-payments situations of Latvia, Hungary, and Romania. Lastly, the ECB 
may take on a more significant new role: if necessary to increase market confidence, 
the ECB can now buy member state bonds, an activity in which it has not previously 
engaged. 
 
The European Financial Stabilization Mechanism was announced with the 
IMF contributing up to an additional €220 billion to €250 billion (about $280 billion to 
$318 billion). This is in line with the Greece package, where the Eurozone states 
contributed roughly 2/3 and the IMF 1/3. IMF Managing Director John Lipsky 
reportedly later clarified the news reports about the IMF contribution to the European 
Financial Stabilization Mechanism, saying that these pledges were ―illustrative‖ of the 
support that the IMF could provide.27 Reportedly, Lipsky reiterated that the IMF only 
provides loans to countries that have requested IMF assistance and that Greece is 
the only Eurozone country to date that has requested IMF assistance. 
 
 
 
-European Integration threatened by Southern Europe’s crisis 
 
 
Greece‘s debt crisis has also launched a number of broader debates about 
the EU‘s monetary union. Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, skeptics have 
pointed to a mismatch between the EU‘s advanced economic and monetary union 
and an incomplete political union. Even within the economic areas where the EU is 
more tightly integrated, the Eurozone has a single monetary policy but 16 separate (if 
loosely coordinated) national fiscal policies. Critics argue that this arrangement is 
prone to problems and imbalances that threaten the viability of having a common 
currency.  
 
Others assert that the crisis in South Europe points to the need for stronger 
EU economic governance, at the very least in the form of a tighter and more 
enforceable Stability and Growth Pact. Going further, some proponents of deeper 
integration would like to use the crisis to launch a discussion about moving towards a 
more integrated EU-wide fiscal policy. 
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Additionally, some officials and analysts have proposed that the EU create a 
new European Monetary Fund (EMF) that would allow it to respond more smoothly to 
financial crises within individual member states in the future, operating much like the 
IMF but on a regional, rather than global, basis. There is some discussion that this 
would require a new governing treaty for the EU, which may be politically difficult to 
pass. Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, similar proposals for creating 
an institution like the IMF, but operating specifically within the region, were discussed 
but no such institution was created. 28 
 
Finally, current crisis has brought to light imbalances within the Eurozone.47 
Some Northern European countries, such as Germany, have relied on exports for 
economic growth and pursued policies that aim to promote such export-led growth, 
such as wage moderation to keep the costs of production low and make exports 
competitive. Combined with conservative fiscal policies that promote high levels of 
savings, these countries have run large current account surpluses. In contrast, some 
Southern European countries, like as Spain, Greece and Portugal have had higher 
levels of wage growth and more expansionary fiscal policies, leading to less 
competitive exports and lower levels of savings. These countries have run large 
current account deficits and borrowed to finance these deficits. 
 
 
 
8. “Eurozone and economic instability in Southern Europe.  Did it 
express the fear of Euro Dissolution or Potential Extensive 
Political Instability in Europe?” 
 
 However, the prevailing fear that even some mild adjustment and any reforms 
in the field of fiscal policy would lead to decreased acceptance of the euro and a fall 
in its value compared to the dollar is completely justified and real with the magnitudes 
that are currently valid. The question is who is beneficiary: as I mentioned in the 
introduction, Germany. 
 
On the other hand, for peripheral countries such as Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal, nothing attractive emerges from this prospect. German workers will 
continue to receive pressure and the peripheral countries will continue to have large 
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deficits and to be unstably integrated within the Eurozone, begging for occasional 
outbursts of fiscal pity ―in order to avoid tensions and to extend the time for finding 
the best crisis management solution.‖ 
 
 It should not be considered a surprise that the sections of the European left in 
the peripheral countries, but also in the central ones, sought more radical changes in 
order for the weaker classes, such as workers, not to be affected.  One goal is the 
abolition of the Stability Pact. Of course, if this proposal is applied, no one knows 
what will follow. Certainly there will be greater independence of countries to exercise 
fiscal policy and determine deficits and national debt, always within a unified 
European framework, which, however, will not be pleasing at all to the central 
countries. 
The citizens of the peripheral countries are afraid that they will be making 
sacrifices without an end in sight. In the coming years, economic sacrifices will be 
unavoidable. The issue is whether they will be shared fairly within society; t is 
something that the left in Europe emphasizes. Many people are afraid that since the 
peripheral countries possess production structures with intermediate technology and 
in combination with liberalization, this will lead to a decline in workers' income to the 
extant that they will become serfs and slave markets will be created, a choice that the 
elites in the countries of the South seem to approve of under the current conditions, 
with these countries staying in the euro zone. 
A dialogue between the forces that support an existence from the euro zone 
of those countries that create problems in the social structure of their states and 
those that will try to change the institutional regime of the euro zone for the benefit of 
the enlargement of the European Union is considered necessary. Any burdens that 
will arise from these changes are to be decided by society in terms of whether they 
will be shared fairly. 
In Europe nowadays the major problem is not the derailing of European 
integration in the direction of worldwide integration, at least until today, since 
nationalism, the persistent child of the French revolution, seems to be preserving and 
protecting the decisions of national governments, even if they take anti-popular 
measures for the benefit of preserving national pride and history; the latter, of course, 
has an important role in dividing Europe, since the creation of today's economic and 
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political conditions is a result of two worldwide imperialistic wars with dramatic 
consequences for the states that were then economically weak. This does not mean 
that we should erase history, since it is the guide for us not to make the same 
mistakes as in the past. The problem today is that German competitiveness has 
galloped ahead so far in recent years that the German governments have the luxury 
of exercising pressure on workers without affecting the political stability of the federal 
state and its national dimension; besides, the creation of the states of Central Europe 
was supported by economic development and the protective umbrella held over its 
citizens' welfare. In the states of Southern Europe, productivity did not increase to 
such an extent as to compensate fully for the pressure on the popular classes. 
Austerity policy will not contribute much to the problem of increasing 
competitiveness, and in countries with fiscal problems will create social polarization 
and possibly dreadful results if citizens reach the limits of poverty.  
Thus, if today what is sought in the countries of Central Europe is a politically 
unified Europe, then they must accept certain concessions in order to avoid the 
domino effect from a hardening of society before every anti-popular measure that will 
be applied in the future. 
 
9. EMU as a vehicle of socio-political stability across European 
Union. 
 
The idea of a European budget that would reach the size of 5-6% of the total 
budget of the Euro zone in order to coordinate the fiscal policy of the states should 
not be abandoned. In addition, what the governments of the South present as the 
single source of salvation, growth, could be achieved through the systematic 
intervention of the European Investment Bank in order to implement public 
investment programs, which would be of a redistributive nature and would have as 
their main pursuit the social integration of the poorer layers of society. With this 
theoretical choice, today's incongruities could be reduced in the desired growth of 
Europe, which at present seems to be a great chimera. 
  
University of Macedonia 
Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies 
MA in the Politics and Economics of Contemporary Eastern and South Eastern Europe  
 
 
 
pg. 29 
 
 The European Union should protect working conditions and workers' salaries 
by adopting a unified European policy on salaries, which at the lowest level would be 
at 50-60% of the average European salary, in order to avoid the probable scenario of 
medieval labor relations, which is apparent in countries with high levels of 
unemployment and low growth rates such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal. In 
addition, there could be European mechanisms for coordinating workers' salaries, 
which would take into consideration productivity, inflation, and unemployment. The 
difference in competitiveness among the countries of the euro zone could be blunted 
if labor's shares in contributing to the national product were more or less the same in 
all of them, an element that also led to the first crisis. 
 
 The European Union considers it necessary, in order to safeguard its 
economic integration, to apply measures such as for example, a European 
unemployment insurance fund, which would be beneficial for workers. Such 
proposals, however, essentially promote the ―good euro‖; that is, they do not directly 
analyze the problem of coordinating a milder fiscal policy and they do not focus on 
the consequences of independence for the operation of the ECB. The euro should 
function in favor of the workers, especially in weak economies where the margin for 
the exercise of an autonomous national policy is very small. 29 
 
The above strategy appears to provide a political basis that could assimilate 
and possibly unite all the workers of Southern and Northern Europe, and thus the 
expectation of economic and further political integration would not seem utopian. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, the above policy does not bear only positive fruit. The 
euro is competing with the dollar for the sceptre to the throne of global currency and 
a mild fiscal policy with the probable abolition of the Stability Pact would create the 
conditions for the large banks in the euro zone not to be competitive at the 
international level; therefore, the euro would also lose its value against the dollar. 
The appearance of speculatory attacks on countries with high deficits is an event that 
haunted Greece before the support mechanism arrived to save it, even temporarily.  
 A zone with a common currency cannot carry large and easily variable public 
deficits of some of its members on its back. The euro zone cannot issue a global 
currency and in parallel allow its member states to enjoy fiscal independence. The 
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real solution would not be an expanded budget, but a unified one that would be 
implemented by a government mutually acceptable to all the member states of the 
euro zone, in order to support the currency. In order for this to occur, however, it 
requires the overturning of the existing political and institutional regime. 
 The Euro, of course, is attempting to achieve its recognition as a global 
currency, but it does not have the same historic course as the dollar. In addition, 
Europe was never an optimal currency area, so as to support such an attempt in 
reality, and the dollar, even if it loses more of its value today, does not lose its 
acceptance. The federal state of the United States is present to act as guarantor for 
all debt. In Europe, no state can play this role. Therefore, a radical reform of fiscal 
matters in the euro zone would not create only political problems for the creation of 
the alliance that would contribute to the change, but it would also very probably lead 
to the failure of the EMY, since the prominent international role that the euro plays 
would sustain pressure and thus the ―good euro‖ could lead to its own abolition, 
leading Europe to a radical change in its structure and society. 
Thus, those that support solutions that propose the complete abolition of the 
SGP and the adoption of an expanded European budget with a more redistributive 
nature should also consider the international role of the euro. Certainly, a coordinated 
social and economic transformation of the economy is required in order to avoid 
phenomena that are visible in the peripheral economies of Europe, such as cutbacks 
on all social expenditure and an ensuing flare-up in the democracy and social 
cohesion of these countries. 
- Can bankruptcy be a sustainable scenario for the three Southern European states?  
For the question of whether ―bankruptcy‖ is compatible with remaining in the 
euro zone, the answer is yes, since the Stability and Growth Pact limits the allowable 
deficits, but allows national governments to find out on their own how they will 
balance the budget. Athens or Madrid and Lisborn decide whether it will reduce the 
budget by closing hospitals and schools, reducing public investments and other 
social benefits. It is not written anywhere in the Pact that the obligations of the state 
towards its creditors prevail over its responsibilities towards its citizens. Who receives 
what is voted on each year anew by the national delegation. It is an issue of political 
decision, by Athens, Madrid and Lisborn and not by Frankfurt or Brussels, whether 
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the budget will save the social state or the banks. Of course, the question also has a 
further answer: if Greece, Spain and Portugal attempted to announce a suspension 
of payments or to abandon the euro zone, then the private sector and the popular 
base would feel the worst impact, while the country would be tried by even worse 
political upheavals, undermining even its own existence. Trade unions, political 
formations, and mass organizations would show a strong resistance to poverty. 
Fortunately, at least until today, national governments of the South will probably find 
support due to the widespread popular fear of a national bankruptcy and national 
pride, even due to the mutation that ―extreme right-wing parties‖ are showing in 
Europe, which appear to be struggling more for the problems of society than for the 
ideological cliches of the past, with the left, on the other hand, becoming a supporter 
of worldwide totalitarianism, and the crisis that we are experiencing today was of an 
international nature when it began. 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
In the regional areas, the Growth and Stability Pact did not allow the public 
sector to systematically record financial deficits. As a consequence, the deficits in the 
current account balance are mainly attributed to financial deficits of the public sector. 
Furthermore, current account deficits were excessively with bank loans from the 
center. 
In brief, the debt is largely owing to the behavior of the private sector within 
the EMU. Unable to compete with the center, regional private sectors produced huge 
financial deficits. Consumption rose in all three Southern European countries, while a 
real estate bubble came up in Spain. Capital flows from abroad –mostly loans by 
central banks- were the main source of financing. Moreover, the domestic financial 
system found the opportunity to expand, thus inflating the domestic financialization 
and debt. 
Governments of the three countries have been given to an application of the 
most severe and frugal fiscal policy which most afflicts the poor rank of their citizens. 
The prospect of social stability and national sovereignty in south Europe depends on 
how the other European citizens will accept the deduction in their purchasing power 
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for the sake of a controversial European integration. Owing to an existence, until 
today, of national economies and not a supranational one which could conduct to a 
supranational state with a pan European character, states in south Europe are 
obliged to be subjected to bad effects of a inefficient past.     
The vote of the citizens, which legitimizes governments, is the strongest 
weapon in order to find the best solution for societies; besides, what it will undergo is 
its own choice, in contemporary democracy, the best one. However, the best vote is 
also the one exercised by a citizen with a proper education, mainly a social one but 
also a political one; today, European education is possibly the only tool that will be 
able to bring about real political stability and pressure from society for the creation of 
a unified European government that will support the rights of the European citizen; 
this will be the new reliable umbrella with integrity, without the well-known short-
sighted partisan interests of national governments, which will protect it from the 
apparent global imperialism of multinational corporations and capital. 
 
Notes 
 
1
 www.HB news.gr ―, Unbelievable statement made by Barroso for collapse of democracy in Greece‖ 
15/06/2010 
2 
www.ispania.gr, article published in 18/06/2010 ―Barroso‘s harsh message for Greece, Spain and 
Portugal‖ 
3 
www.in.gr-news-economy.htm, see the very interesting article ‖why German is the big winner of the 
economical crisis‖ published in 13/08/2010.  
4 
Details and comments about Werner‘s report, how the creation of ERM completed see in Sotiris 
Theodoropoulos‘ book ―European Economical integration‖ published in Athens by A. Stamoulis 1997, 
chapter 4 page 121. 
5 
The Treaty of Maastricht, see in George Voskopoulos‘ book ―European Union‖ published by Epikentro 
in Thessaloniki 2009, chapter 3 page 87-89. 
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6 
About a brief historical review for Greece, Spain, Portugal and Germany see www. Wikipedia.com the 
free encyclopedia. 
 
7
 See below in reference number 1. 
 
8 
More details about steps from Werner‘s report to Maastricht Treaty see data from 
http://europa.eu.legislation_summaries. 
 
9 
The cause to analyze the following paragraphs was the question made by a student to director of 
EKTA mr. Panagiotou- info@ekta1.gr ― Would be economical crisis in Greece if ECB reacts like FED?‖ 
and published by Analytis.com in 25/08/2010. 
 
10
 See below in reference number 2. 
 
11 
See below in reference number 3. 
 
12 
For more details about the legal framework of ECB see. www.ecb.europa.eu/home. 
13 
For more details about the policy of ECB see. www.ecb.europa.eu/home 
 14 
http://www1.rizospastis.gr/wwwengine/story.do?id=2277959 
15 
http://www.avgi.gr/ArticleActionshow.action?articleID=519741 
16 
Radical Changes to the Stability Pact‖ by Katerina Siokou, Kathimerini.gr, September 6, 2010 
17 
Kostas Tsahakis and Giorgos Daratos, September 6, 2010 e-go.gr,  
18 
See below in reference number 4. 
19 
See below in reference number 5. 
20
 It refers a seminar organized by the Economia Business Tank in November 2008 with task ―national 
financial crisis and Greece, published by Kerkyra S.A in February 2009 
21 
By Yu Shi Yu Singapore, Translated By Edward Seah,3 February 2010 ,Edited by Jessica Boesl, 
www.watching America.com) 
22
George Stathakis, Spain and the new cycle of European Crisis, published by 
www.avgi.gr/ArticleActionshow.action in 20/06/2010 
23
 See below in reference number 6. 
 
24 
The policy of Eurozone leads the weak economically countries in south Europe to social exclusion. 
www.Iskra.gr, article by Mr. Tolios Ioannis. 
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25 
Sundays Ethnos, 08/08/2010 page 48, article by Professor in economics studies of Aristotel‘s 
University of Thessaloniki Mardas Dimitrios 
 
26
 IMF, ―Frequently Asked Questions: Greece,‖ May 11, 2010. 
27 
Bob Davis, ―IMF‘s Reach Spreads to Western Europe,‖ Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2010. 
28
Nelson D. Schwartz and Sewell Chan, ―In Greece‘s Crisis, Fed Studies Wall St.‘s Activities,‖ New York 
Times, February 25, 2010. Congressional research service, Greece‘s debt crisis 
29 
See below in reference number 7. 
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